Alexandre Fon

https://www.alexandrefon.io

University of California, Los Angeles

Department of Economics
Bunche Hall, 315 Portola Plaza
Los Angeles, CA 90095

Phone: (424) 270-5315
Email: afon@ucla.edu
Citizenship: Canada, France
Birth date: August 12, 1992

Placement:

Lee Ohanian, ohanian@econ.ucla.edu, (310) 825-0979

Maurizio Mazzocco, mmazzocc@econ.ucla.edu, (310) 825-6682

Jay Lu, jay@econ.ucla.edu, (310) 825-7380

Placement Assistant: Chiara Paz, placement@econ.ucla.edu, (310) 206-1413

Education:

Ph.D. Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, 2015 to Present, Expected May 2021

Thesis Title: "Asymmetric Information in the Household with an Application to Bangladesh"

Fields: Labor, Development, Applied Econometrics

References:

Maurizio Mazzocco	Rosa Matzkin
Dept. of Economics, UCLA	Dept. of Economics, UCLA
mmazzocc@econ.ucla.edu	matzkin@econ.ucla.edu
Phone: (310) 825-6682	Phone: (310) 825-7371
Bernardo Silveira	
Dept. of Economics, UCLA	
silveira@econ.ucla.edu	

M.A. Economics, Sciences Po Paris, 2015
B.A. Social Sciences, Sciences Po Paris, *Cum Laude* 2013

Teaching Experience:

UCLA Teaching Fellow:
Intermediate Microeconomics, UCLA, 2019
Introduction to Microeconomics, UCLA, 2018 & 2019

Evidence-Based Policy Analysis, Masters Class, UCLA, 2017

Introduction to Econometrics, UCLA, 2017

Statistics for Economics, 2016 & 2017

Research Experience:

UCLA, Research Assistant for Professor Till von Wachter, 2018

OECD, Research Assistant in the Directorate for Employment, Labour, and Social Affairs, 2014

Invited Presentation:

September 2020: Graduate Student Paper Award, Bank of Canada

Honors and Awards:

UCLA Graduate Dissertation Year Fellowship, 2020-2021

Bank of Canada Graduate Paper Award Short-List

UCLA Award Recognizing Outstanding Performance in the Shift to Remote Learning, 2020

UCLA Graduate Summer Research Mentorship, 2017

UCLA Graduate Fellowship, 2015-2016

Working Papers:

Asymmetric Information in the Household with an Application to Bangladesh, Job Market Paper

What is the effect of asymmetric information about income on household decisions, resource sharing, and welfare? In this paper, I answer this question in four steps. In the first step, I develop a theoretical model that accounts for the possible existence of asymmetric information. The model predicts that households will partly mitigate the welfare cost of asymmetric information by incentivizing the wage earner to provide information about his or her true income. These incentives are provided by making the consumption share increase with reported income: the wage earner's consumption share is high when reporting a high income and low when reporting a low income. Second, I derive a new identification result for this model. The result states that individual welfare functions can be recovered with at least one assignable good - a good that is observed at the individual level rather than the household level. The result also shows that the effect of asymmetric information on individual welfare can be identified separately from other variables impacting welfare. Third, I estimate the model using a survey of Bangladeshi day laborers. The estimation confirms the predictions of the model, providing evidence that the households in the data are affected by asymmetric information. Finally, I conduct three counterfactual analyses to document how asymmetric information interacts with policies. I compute the willingness-to-pay in each case.

Individual Rather Than Household Euler Equations: Identification and Estimation of Individual Preferences Using Household Data, (joint with Maria Casanova and Maurizio Mazzocco)

In this paper, it is shown that the intratemporal and intertemporal preferences of each decision-maker in the household can be identified even if individual consumption is not observed. This identification result is used jointly with the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to estimate the intratemporal and intertemporal features of individual preferences. This paper is one of the first attempts to provide estimates of the wife's and husband's intertemporal preferences by taking into account that household behavior is the outcome of joint decisions. The empirical findings indicate that there is heterogeneity in intertemporal preferences between wife and husband. The identification and estimation results are important for at least two reasons. First, they suggest that to answer policy questions the household decision process should be characterized using one set of preferences for each decision-maker. Second, the estimates of individual preferences provided in this paper can be used to evaluate policies aimed at affecting household intertemporal behavior.

The Effects of Paternity Leave: Evidence from the Introduction of a "Father's Quota" in Quebec

This paper uses a major reform of the parental leave system in Quebec in 2006 to analyze how households make decisions related to parental leave. It shows that the introduction of a father's quota - a policy designed to incentivize fathers to take parental leave - was successful in more than doubling the proportion of fathers taking some parental leave. This paper also provides strong evidence that households prefer to specialize: close to 80% of households split paid parental leave between parents with the mother taking as many weeks as possible and the father as little as possible. Finally, an administrative dataset allows a detailed analysis of the relationship between parental leave decisions and income. In general, households with higher labor income take more parental leave overall (summing the mother's and the father's weeks). However, fathers with higher labor income take less parental leave, indicating a higher degree of specialization.

Skills:
Fluent in French and English, Conversational Spanish.
Computer skills: STATA, R, MATLAB, Python, SQL.

Last updated: November 17, 2020